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aBStract
Migration from Mexico to the United States has been increased by 
liberalization of the Mexican economy. Proponents of liberalization had 
maintained that it would reduce migration; indeed, they used this argument 
along with anti-immigrant sentiment as one basis on which to sell the North 
American Free Trade Agreement to the U.S. public. The anti-immigration 
demagogy was not only offensive in sentiment but also wrong in substance. 
Various impacts of liberalization have been causal factors moving people 
northward and maintaining the high rate of migration. This reality should force 
a reassessment of policy in the United States. A policy that accepted the reality 
of continuing migration and integrated the immigrants into the labor force with 
full rights could have widespread benefits.
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reSumen
Las migraciones desde México a EE.UU. han aumentado por la 
liberalización de la economía mexicana. Los defensores de la liberalización 
habían mantenido que ésta reduciría las migraciones; de hecho, usaban tal 
argumento junto con el sentir anti-inmigrantes como base para hacer atractivo 
al público estadounidense el Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte. 
La demagogia anti-inmigración no sólo era ofensiva sino errónea en cuanto a 
su contenido. Diversos efectos de la liberalización han actuado como factores 
causales de los movimientos de personas hacia el Norte y del mantenimiento 
de altas tasas de migración. Esta realidad debería forzar una re-evaluación de 
las políticas en EE.UU. Una política que aceptara la realidad de las continuas 
migraciones y que integrara a los inmigrantes a la fuerza de trabajo con 
derechos plenos podría tener amplios beneficios. 
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1 . introduction1
In the 2004 Hollywood disaster movie The Day After Tomorrow, a huge 
storm spreads super-freezing weather over most of the United States, yielding 
a massive rush of U.S. residents towards the Mexican border – where they are 
barred from entry by the Mexican authorities. The scene must elicit a certain 
grim satisfaction from many Mexican viewers who have been denied entry to 
the United States.2 
There is an element of truth implicit in the far fetched scenario of The Day 
After Tomorrow, namely that it would require something as fantastic as a new 
ice age spreading rapidly across North America to reverse the current migratory 
flow from Mexico to the United States. Moreover, in spite of various forecasts of 
an impending decline in Mexico-to-U.S. migration, the high rate of movement 
of people northward, firmly established in the 1990s and early years of the 
new century, is most likely to continue. Although demographic trends within 
Mexico may attenuate the rate of migration and although economic variations 
in both countries will yield downs as well as ups in the rate, the preponderance 
of economic and social forces will continue to move large numbers of people 
northward. In recent years, the U.S. government’s increased efforts to restrict 
Mexicans from entering the United States appear to have had little impact 
– except that of increasing the number of people who die attempting to avoid 
the border patrol (Cornelius, 2001).
Migration from Mexico to the United States was given new strength in 
the 1990s by the liberalization of the Mexican economy, through the general 
process of restructuring that began in the early 1980s and then through 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
reviSta de economía mundial 14, 2006, 57-85
1 I am grateful for the useful comments and advice I have received from Margery Davies, Enrico 
Marcelli, Bob Sutcliffe, and participants in a faculty seminar at the University of Massachusetts 
Boston.
2 The movie resolves the border crisis with an additional irony: the Mexican government allows the 
U.S. citizens to cross the border when the U.S. President agrees to cancel Latin American debt.
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took effect on January 1, 1994.3 Proponents of liberalization had maintained 
that it would reduce the rate of migration; indeed, they used this argument 
along with anti-immigrant sentiment as one basis on which to sell NAFTA to 
the U.S. public. The anti-immigration demagogy, it turns out, was not only 
offensive in sentiment but also wrong in substance. In reality, various impacts 
of liberalization have been causal factors moving people northward across the 
border and maintaining the high rate of migration.
The likelihood that the migration of Mexicans to the United States will 
continue apace, to a large extent regardless of increasingly restrictive and 
often draconian U.S. immigration policies, should force a reassessment of 
policy. Current policy yields a high rate of unauthorized immigration to the 
United States, and, accordingly, a large number of Mexicans working in the 
United States are without legal status. The result is not only a poorly treated 
Mexican under-class in the U.S. labor force. Most likely there is also a spread 
of perverse impacts, radiating out among other workers in the United States. 
A policy that accepted the reality of continuing Mexico-to-U.S. migration 
and integrated the immigrants into the labor force with full rights could have 
widespread benefits for both the immigrants themselves and for much of the 
rest of the U.S. population.
2 .
The movement of people from Mexico to the United States is one of the 
world’s largest migratory movements between two countries. Mexico is by 
far the largest source of U.S. immigrants, accounting for 44 percent of the 
total number of authorized and unauthorized immigrants to the United States 
during the 1990s, as shown in Table 1. In the middle years of the decade, 
1994 through 1996, an average of 600 thousand migrants moved across the 
boarder. These were the years immediately following the implementation of 
NAFTA. Throughout the 1990s decade, immigration from Mexico accounted for 
28 percent of all authorized immigration to the United States and 66 percent 
of the unauthorized immigration. (The large upward “spikes” of authorized 
immigrants at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s are artifacts 
of the way the U.S. government presents the data. Authorized immigration in 
these years includes people who had previously entered the United States 
without authorization but who then obtained legal status under provisions of 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.)
3 By “liberalization,” I mean primarily the elimination or reduction of restrictions and regulations on 
the cross-border movement of goods, services and capital. But such changes in the restrictions and 
regulations on international commerce are often accompanied, as has been the case in Mexico, by 
the reduction of regulations of the internal market as well – for example, regulations of banking and 
regulations of land sales (the ejido issue noted below). The term “liberalization” also applies to this 
larger set of changes. I should emphasize that liberalization policies have not included the elimination 
or reduction of restrictions and regulations on the cross-border movement of labor – that is, of 
people.
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During the second half of the 20th century, each decade – and especially the 
1980s – saw a sharp increase in the number of authorized immigrants to the 
United States, with Mexico accounting for an increasing proportion; see Table 
2. In the 1990s the rate of increase of authorized immigration was reduced. 
However, available government data on unauthorized immigration indicate 
that in the case of Mexico the overall high rate of immigration was maintained 
through the 1990s. U.S. government data on unauthorized immigration do not 
exist for the period since 2000. Non-government studies, however, particularly 
those issued by the Pew Hispanic Center, indicate that the overall rate of 
immigration from Mexico to the United States has not dropped off. (Bean et 
al ., 2001, and Passel, 2005a and 2005b)4 Furthermore, the fact that U.S.-
to-Mexico remittances more than doubled in the 2000 to 2003 period, from 
$6.6 billion to $13.3 billion, even while the U.S. economy was in recession, 
suggests that the rate of migration did not abate in the first years of the new 
century.5
taBle 2: authorized immigration to the united StateS, 1950 – 2000
                              mexico aS a      increaSe over    previouS decade 
  total  from mexico   Share of total         total              mexico
1951-1960 2,514,479   299,811   11.9%
1961-1970 3,321,677   453,937   13.7%    32.1%   51.4%
1971-1980 4,493,314   640.294   14.2%    35.3%   41.1%
1981-1990 7,338,062 1,655,843   22.6%    63.3%  158.6%
1991-2000 9,095,417 2,249,421   24.7%    23.9%   35.8%
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics and 
earlier years, http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Immigs.htm.
The data for recent years do not reveal a clear trend, as is evident when 
the annual Mexico-to-U.S. figures are set out in graphic form, as in Figure 
1. Especially in the absence of official data on unauthorized immigrants in 
the post-2000 period, a very large number of whom are from Mexico, any 
arguments about the longer term changes in Mexico-to-U.S. migration are 
necessarily speculative. Nonetheless, the data do demonstrate that the claims 
made by political authorities, attempting to gain public support for trade and 
investment liberalization between the two countries, have not been borne out. 
For example, Cornelius (2002; p. 290), cites an early 1990s statement by 
4 Passel (2005a, p. 1) writes: “About 80 to 85 percent of the migration from Mexico in recent years 
has been undocumented.” Combined with the government data of Table 1, these figures imply 
average annual total Mexico-to-U.S. migration in the 2000-2003 period of over one million, a figure 
substantially higher than for any period of the 1990s.
5 The remittance figures are from Orozco (2004); and see below the discussion of migration as a 
“family strategy” in subsection 4.3 on “Employment and Incomes”.
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then U.S. President Bill Clinton, attempting to gain support for NAFTA with the 
claim: “If NAFTA passes, you won’t have what you have now, which is everybody 
runs up to the maquiladora line, gets a job in a factory, and then runs across 
the border to get a better job. Instead there will be more uniform growth in 
investment across [Mexico], and people will be able to work at home with their 
families. And over the period of the next few years, we will dramatically reduce 
pressures on illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States.” 
figure 1 - méxico to u .S . migration, 1987-2003
Figure 1 - Mexico to U.S. Migration, 1987-2003
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While such naive (or disingenuous) statements have been belied by the 
experience of subsequent years, there is a more sophisticated version of the 
liberalization-reduces-emigration argument that is not – or not yet – in conflict 
with the data. This more sophisticated version recognizes that the initial 
impacts of trade liberalization are likely to raise the level of emigration because 
of the dislocation, especially of agricultural workers, that it generates. However, 
in this version of the argument, after about a decade, the level of emigration 
falls back to the level it would have been in the absence of liberalization, and 
thereafter continues to fall further (relative to what it would have been) as the 
full alleged impacts of liberalization take effect. This argument has been most 
thoroughly developed on several occasions by Martin (1993, 2002, 200X) 
and by Cornelius and Martin (1993). Because the timing of this pattern is not 
exact in the argument and because the date of the beginning of liberalization in 
Mexico is not well defined, this version of the liberalization-reduces-emigration 
argument cannot be tested with available data – although the trends to date 
do not lend support to the argument.
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More important, however, the rationale for this pattern of migration is a 
weak one, where crucial steps are not supported – neither by the particular 
experience of Mexico nor by the more general experience of many countries. 
3 .
The steps in the argument that liberalization leads to reduced emigration 
from Mexico are set out in Diagram 1: Liberalization brings about a reduced 
level of emigration from Mexico because liberalization yields an expansion of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and of international trade, which (a) leads to 
economic growth, an expansion of GDP, which (b) then expands employment, 
reducing unemployment (and underemployment) and increasing income 
(reducing poverty), which means (c) there is a reduction in the population of 
those likely to emigrate. Step (c) is helped along (c’) by demographic trends in 
Mexico that are reducing the share of the population in the age group likely to 
migrate.6 All of this yields (d) a reduction of emigration.
diagram 1 - the argument that liBeralization yieldS a reduction of emigration
arthur macewan
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The more sophisticated version of this argument posits these same 
continuing impacts of liberalization, but it also asserts the existence of some 
short-run impacts that bring change in the other direction. Liberalization, 
along with the expansion of FDI and international trade that it generates, (i) 
brings about a displacement of agricultural labor. The resulting increase of the 
agricultural “surplus population” cannot be absorbed immediately in the labor 
force in spite of economic growth, leading (ii) to a rise of unemployment (or 
underemployment) and stagnant incomes (or falling incomes at the bottom). 
Thus the initial stages of liberalization and economic growth will, instead of 
reducing the population of those likely to migrate, actually (iii) increase this pool 
of ready migrants. Even with the impact of demographic change (which may be 
minimal in the very short-run), the short run will see (iv) a rise in emigration.
Nonetheless, in this argument, after a relatively short time – no more 
than a decade or so – economic growth and labor absorption will dominate 
displacement, and things will start to move in the other direction, reducing 
emigration. The keys to the whole process are, first, the expansion of FDI 
and international trade that is generated by liberalization and, second, the 
resulting economic growth. Furthermore, the economic growth in Mexico must 
be more rapid than in the United States – that is, there must be a convergence 
of the two economies to reduce the migration pressure. (It is possible that even 
convergence would not be sufficient to stem the rising rate of migration; see the 
comments below subsection 4.1 on “Liberalization and Economic Growth”.
There is, however, a very different interpretation of the relationship 
between liberalization and emigration from Mexico, an interpretation that 
fits well with many facets of economic change in Mexico of recent decades. 
Liberalization certainly generates an expansion of FDI and international trade, 
but the impacts on economic growth, employment and incomes are such that 
emigration is increased, not decreased. This different interpretation is set out 
in Diagram 2.7
As with the argument that liberalization leads to reduced emigration, here too 
the immediate impact of liberalization is an expansion of FDI and international 
trade. From that point on, however, the two arguments diverge. In Diagram 2, 
the expansion of FDI and international trade, first, does not have such salutary 
impacts on economic growth; it leads (a1) to only limited expansion of GDP, 
6 During the 1960s, the Mexican population grew at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, but that rate 
fell by almost half, to 1.8 percent, in the 1990s. Data are from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica 
Geograpia e Informatica (INEGI) web site:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/med.asp?t=mpob08&c=3185
7 The argument owes much to Sassen (1988). Relatively early in the late-20th century surge of 
liberalization, Sassen argued that liberalization – especially the rising FDI that comes with liberalization 
– tended to generate emigration from low income countries: “The generalization of market relations 
and the development of modern forms of production have historically had a disruptive effect on 
traditional work structures… The expansion of export manufacturing and export agriculture, both 
inseparably related with direct foreign investment from the highly industrialized countries, has 
mobilized new segments of the population into regional and long-distance migrations.” (pp. 18-19) 
This approach has been picked up by others and applied to the Mexico-to-U.S. migration, yielding 
analyses complementary to that presented here; see, in particular, Canales (2003).
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and probably no expansion relative to what would have occurred without 
liberalization. Second, there is (a2) the displacement of workers in traditional 
agriculture, but also in myriad small scale businesses – especially service 
and trade activities. Third, the expansion of foreign commerce generates (a3) 
new entrants to the labor force, largely women. On the one hand, women are 
“pulled” into employment in new export manufacturing firms (maquiladoras). 
On the other hand, women are “pushed” out of unpaid work in small scale 
family business (largely in agriculture, services, and trade) as these activities 
are replaced by large scale, often foreign, firms. The result is an expansion 
of the labor force participation rate (LFPR), especially the female labor force 
participation rate.
With only slow growth of GDP, labor absorption is minimal. Combined with 
the displacement of labor from traditional and small scale business and the 
rise of the labor force participation rate, the minimal labor absorption means 
(b) a high rate of unemployment or, more clearly, underemployment or both. 
Also, these conditions mean a failure of bottom-level incomes to rise, worsening 
diagram 2 - the argument that liBeralization yieldS riSing emigration
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8 See, for example, Massey et al. (2002) and Sutcliffe (2004).
poverty and perhaps increasing inequality. Consequently, the population 
likely to emigrate (c) tends to rise and a high rate of emigration continues (d). 
Worsening poverty in Mexico creates a dual motivation for emigration to the 
United States, as migrants seek income for themselves and income that they 
can remit to families who remain in Mexico. 
The rising role of women in the paid labor force will over the long run 
combine (b’) with already established demographic trends and reduce (c’) the 
share of the population in the age group likely to emigrate. This will somewhat 
attenuate the processes described by the rest of Diagram 2. Nonetheless, the 
pressures created by slow growth and labor force change are likely to dominate 
and maintain high levels of emigration.
But this does not complete the interpretation of liberalization’s impact on 
Mexico-to-U.S. migration, as changes in the structure of the U.S. economy also 
play a role. In particular, a combination of factors generate a strong demand 
for low-wage, relatively unskilled labor. Thus while circumstances in Mexico are 
causing (d) more emigration, circumstances in the United States also are (d’) 
bringing about the high rate of movement of people across the border. These 
factors operating in the United States to generate the demand for immigrants 
are, in fact, a product of the same larger economic and political changes that 
have brought about liberalization in Mexico (Sassen, 1988).
In addition, there is a “critical mass” effect. As more people move from 
Mexico to the United States, establish communities, and gain employment, 
they make it easier for others to follow – and therefore more likely that others 
will follow. (Marcelli and Cornelius, 2001, and Rivero-Fuentes, 2004). This 
phenomenon, which exists with all immigrant communities, is made more 
powerful in recent years by the operation of U.S. immigration policy. The policy 
makes it harder for people to enter the United States. Thus, once in the country, 
they are less likely to return to Mexico for fear they will not be able to get 
back into the United States (Massey, 2003, and Massey et al ., 2002). So they 
stay and form the communities which contribute to a higher rate of migration. 
While probably of importance in maintaining the high level of Mexico-to-United 
States migration, this “critical mass” effect will not be documented here.
This alternative argument regarding Mexico-to-U.S. migration is one form 
of a more general argument that sees increased migration as necessarily 
generated by increased commerce and cultural integration among nations 
– “globalization.”8 The details presented here of the Mexico-U.S. case are 
intended to flesh out this general argument, and the next section of this paper 
will examine the empirical bases for asserting the existence of the causal links 
of Diagram 2. However, many factors in the globalization argument will not 
be considered here, including, for example, the impact of cultural integration 
and the role of a greater availability of information – though these are clearly 
important.
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4 .
4 .1 . liBeralization and economic growth
There is no question regarding the expansion of FDI into Mexico and 
Mexico’s foreign trade during the era of liberalization. Whereas the stock of 
FDI in Mexico stood at $8.1 billion dollars in 1980, it had risen to $22.4 
billion in 1990 in spite of Mexico’s lack of growth during the 1980s. Then the 
figure more than quadrupled by 2000, to $97.2 billion, and jumped again 
to $165.9 billion by 2003. (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 378) Even after adjustment 
for inflation these are large increases, of the sort that were anticipated by 
the advocates of liberalization, as is evident when the FDI stock figures are 
compared to Mexican GDP. In 1980, the FDI stock was only 3.6 percent of 
GDP; it rose to 8.5 percent in 1990, 16.7 percent in 2000, and 26.5 percent 
in 2003 (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 405).
Mexico’s foreign trade (merchandise and non-factor services) showed a 
similar rapid rise during the period since 1980. In the 1980 to 1983 period, 
exports averaged $27.3 billion and imports $26.0 billion. By the first four 
years of the 1990s, these figure had doubled, and then they tripled between 
the early 1990s and the first years of the new century.9
The problem for Mexico is that these large increases of international 
commerce have not been translated into high rates of economic expansion, 
as measured by the growth of GDP per capita. Indeed, for virtually any set 
of years stretching back from 2004 towards 1980, Mexico has grown more 
slowly than the United States. For example, even if we take 1995 as a base 
year, the year in which Mexico’s GDP had fallen drastically as a result of the 
1994 financial crisis, the increase of real per capita GDP to 2004 was only 
21.0 percent, while U.S. per capita GDP in this period grew by 22.3 percent. 
During the years immediately following the 7.8% decline of per capita GDP in 
the 1994-95 crash, the Mexican economy did expand at a reasonable rate, 
but then 2001, 2002 and 2003 all saw declines of per capita GDP, and growth 
in 2004 was moderate. As compared with 1980, Mexican per capita GDP 
had risen by only 16.4 percent by 2004, whereas in the United States the 
increase had been 62.6 percent. The data are shown in Table 3 and Figure 
2. Instead of convergence during the era of Mexico’s liberalization, there has 
been a divergence of the two economies.
9 Trade data are from the Banco de Mexico web site http://www.banxico.org.mx/eInfoFinanciera/
FSinfoFinanciera.html.
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taBle 3: indiceS of groSS domeStic product per capita, mexico and the united StateS, 1980 
to 2004
                                                                Mexico                U.S.
1980 100.00 100.00
1981 106.22 101.50
1982 103.77 98.58
1983 97.26 102.11
1984 98.65 108.49
1985 99.12 111.97
1986 93.55 114.81
1987 93.30 117.63
1988 92.67 121.38
1989 94.72 124.50
1990 97.66 125.44
1991 99.90 123.57
1992 101.64 126.00
1993 101.76 127.69
1994 104.36 131.22
1995 96.19 132.92
1996 99.61 136.25
1997 104.84 140.68
1998 108.59 144.86
1999 110.97 149.58
2000 117.12 153.35
2001 114.63 152.91
2002 113.80 154.20
2003 113.58 157.34
2004 116.41 162.55
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2004. http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/index.htm
 
The divergence between incomes in Mexico and the United States shows 
up clearly in a comparison of per capita income in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP), the best indicator of the real difference between average economic 
well-being in the two countries. In 1980, PPP per capita income in the United 
States was 2.96 times that in Mexico. With the lack of growth in Mexico during 
the 1980s, this figure stood at 3.80 in 1990. As Mexico recovered somewhat 
in the next decade, overall in the 1990s there was little further divergence, 
and the U.S. PPP per capita income was 3.82 times that of Mexico in 2000. 
Divergence picked up again in the next few years, and the ratio stood at 4.06 
in 2004.10
10 These PPP figures are calculated from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 
Database, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/index.htm.
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figure 2 - indiceS of groSS domeStic product per capita, mexico and the united StateS
Figure 2 - Indices of Gross Domestic Product Per 
Capita, Mexico and the United States
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Source: Table 3.
Under these circumstances of slow economic growth in Mexico, especially 
compared to economic growth in the United States, the continuing high rate 
of emigration should not be surprising. The assumption that liberalization 
generates rapid economic expansion is an essential pillar in the liberalization-
yields-reduced-emigration argument. Once this pillar has fallen (or until it is 
erected), the whole argument is bereft of the support it needs.11 
It is worth noting, further, that even were the Mexican economy to experience 
more rapid growth as a result of liberalization, this would not necessarily yield 
a declining rate of emigration to the United States – perhaps the contrary. 
Higher incomes can allow more migration by facilitating the expenses of 
11 Concluding their argument that liberalization – NAFTA in particular – would be likely to lead to a 
reduction of Mexico-to-U.S. migration (following perhaps an initial increase), Cornelius and Martin 
(1993, p. 506) write: “The rapid labor force growth that is inevitable in Mexico over the next ten to 
fifteen years [i.e., through 2004 to 2009] means that Mexico will be unable to absorb the additions 
to its work force without a sharp increase in economic growth (to 6% or more per year, in real terms). 
To achieve such a growth rate in Mexico, gross investment would have to rise to 25 percent of gross 
domestic product… Free trade and the additional foreign domestic investment that it will attract are 
now the only stimuli that can realistically be expected to increase significantly the capacity of the 
Mexican economy to create jobs…” As noted shortly, the ratio of investment to GDP has fallen well 
short of 25 percent.
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moving – everything from transportation costs to fees for border guides (when 
crossing is surreptitious) to living expenses while searching for a job in the 
United States. Thus the argument that liberalization reduces migration may 
require not only convergence of incomes in Mexico and the United States, but 
an advance of Mexico to near equality with the United States. Migration rates 
could continue high with growth or without growth.12 
Nonetheless, the reality in Mexico of recent decades, including the era of 
liberalization, has been one of relative stagnation, and this reality has greatly 
undermined any abatement of the emigration rate. Slow growth in Mexico, 
however, is not the whole story, and there are other reasons that the high rate 
of Mexico-to-U.S. migration has been maintained. 
Before turning to these other reasons, a brief comment on liberalization and 
growth is warranted. The strange thing in the debate over liberalization is that 
those people, economists and politicians, who have promoted liberalization 
have so often treated it as a panacea, the “magic pill,” that by itself would solve 
problems of poverty and economic development. Even if liberalization of foreign 
commerce were to have a positive impact on economic expansion in Mexico – a 
dubious assumption given the history of many countries’ experiences13 – there 
are numerous other factors, ranging from social and educational infrastructure 
to the organization of legal institutions, that also affect economic expansion 
(Helpman, 2004).
One of the most obvious errors in the argument that liberalization 
automatically yields economic growth is the assumption that rising FDI 
increases the rate of capital formation in a country. In Mexico it appears as 
though foreign investment has simply replaced domestic capital formation. 
Table 4 provides data on gross capital formation in relation to GDP in Mexico. 
In spite of the high level of FDI in the 1990s, the rate of capital formation 
was below the rate in the 1970s, the final decade of the pre-liberalization era 
– to say nothing of the low rate of capital formation in the late 1980s, after 
liberalization had begun but when the economy was still suffering from the 
debt debacle generated by policy in the earlier era.
12 See, for example, Nyberg-Sorensen et al. (2002) and U.S. Commission for the Study of International 
Migration and Cooperative Economic Development (1990). These sources, however, tend to see the 
increase associated with successful development as a short-run or medium run phenomenon. The 
argument here is that the phenomenon can be rather long-run, and a decline would occur only with 
convergence or perhaps near equality. 
13 See MacEwan (1999; chapter 2) for a summary of the issues; and see Pieper and Taylor (1999) for 
an examination of the growth impact of IMF and World Bank liberalization programs.
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taBle 4: groSS fixed capital formation in mexico aS a percentage of gdp, 1970 – 2001
  Years Percentage
1970-1975    21.3
1976-1980    22.3
1981-1985    20.8
1986-1990    16.4
1991-1995    18.0
1996-2000    18.8
2000    20.5
2001    19.5
Source: Mattar et al . (2002), Table 1. The original source is Economic Commission for Latin American 
and the Caribbean with INEGI data. Figures for 1970 through 1988 were calculated on the basis of data 
given in 1980 constant pesos; figures for 1989-2001 were based on data in 1993 constant pesos.
4 .2 . diSplacement from agriculture and Small Scale BuSineSS and the 
riSing laBor force participation rate
Although NAFTA is often seen as setting in motion a major transformation 
of Mexican agriculture, the process of replacing the domestic consumption of 
grains with imports was well under way before the 1990s. Barkin (1990) points 
out that, although Mexico had achieved food self-sufficiency by the mid-1960s, 
government policies led to a dramatic change in subsequent decades. By the 
late 1980s, the country was importing close to one-third of its supply of grains; 
an absolute decline in the number of self-employed agricultural workers was 
well underway; and the share of the agricultural workforce that was hired labor 
expanded from 32 percent in 1950 to 51 percent in 1980 (Barkin, 1990, pp. 
19 and 28). Furthermore, in 1992, the Mexican government amended the 
constitution, undermining the ejido, the form of collective land holding that 
had, in spite of the poverty of the Mexican countryside, provided an element 
of security and stability to many poor peasants (Barry, 1995, esp. ch. 7). When 
NAFTA was set in place at the beginning of 1994, it continued this process of 
change.14 
The change has not been confined to agriculture. At the beginning of the 
1990s, only 70 percent of Mexico’s labor force was wage labor. The remaining 
30 percent was self-employed farmers and small shop keepers or unpaid family 
14 The impact of change on the Mexican peasantry should not, however, be viewed as the result of 
peasants’ innate inefficiency or the impossibility of effective small scale farming. Instead, according 
to Barkin (p. 21), the “wholesale abandonment of cultivation of potentially productive rainfed lands 
is the result of policies to restrict price increases for basic food grains, which predominate in rainfed 
agriculture, and the unwillingness [of the government] to provide the necessary credit and inputs 
for the productive exploitation of these areas.” The changes in Mexican agriculture are reflected in 
the continuing process of urbanization: whereas in 1990 71.3 percent of the country’s 81.2 million 
people lived in population centers with more than 2,500 inhabitants, in 2000 74.6 percent of 97.5 
million were in these larger centers of population. From the INEGI website:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/anu.asp?t=mpob12&c=3189
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workers, mainly women but also children. In retail trade, with Wal-Mart now the 
largest private employer in Mexico (Weiner, 2003), thousands of people have 
moved from unpaid employment to become full-scale participants in the paid 
labor force. Whereas in 1991, 13 percent of workers (11.1 percent of male and 
17.4 percent of female workers) worked without pay, by 2004 only 8.4 percent 
were in this category (6.4 percent of males, 12.2 percent of females).15 
As is well known, however, the increasing role of women in the paid labor 
force is not simply a consequence of a “push,” of women being displaced 
from traditional forms of employment. There has also been a “pull” as women 
make up a large share of the growing employment in maquiladoras. Total 
employment in maquiladoras rose from 460 thousand in 1990 to almost 1.3 
million in 2000 (though with the U.S. recession it fell off to 1.1 million by 
2003). Between 55 percent and 60 percent of laborers in these firms are 
women.16 (The total Mexican labor force in 2000 was about 40 million.) 
According to the Commission for Labor Cooperation, “Between 1984 and 
1996, the Mexican female labor force increased by 84 percent, from 6.3 million 
to 11.6 million workers, which amounted to an increase in the female share of 
the total labor force from an initial 27.5 percent in 1984 to 32.8 percent 
by the end of this period.”17 Between 1991 and 2004, the occupied labor 
force rose by over 38 percent, from 30.5 million to 42.3 million.18 During the 
1990s the labor force participation rate overall rose only from 53.6 percent 
in 1991 to 55.7 percent in 2000 and then remained stable as the economy 
stagnated in the 2000 to 2004 period. All of the 1990s increase in the labor 
force participation rate was accounted for by women; the female labor force 
participation rate, which stood at 31.5 percent in 1991, rose to 36.4 percent in 
2000 and then to 37.5 percent (in spite of economic stagnation) by 2004.19
These data, based on the national employment survey (Encuesta Nacional 
de Empleo), are problematic and may understate the degree of change in the 
labor force participation of females. According to McCaa et al . (2001), the 
national censuses of 1990 and 2000 report female labor force participation 
rates of 20.6 percent and 32.9 percent, respectively; and the national urban 
employment surveys report rates of 34.8 percent for 1990 and 41.7 percent 
for 2000. The difference between the census and the survey can be largely 
15 From the INEGI web site:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/anu.asp?t=mtra11&c=3602
16 The data for the post-1995 period are from are from the INEGI web site:
ht tp : / /www. ineg i .gob.mx/est /conten idos /espanol / temat icos /coyuntura /coyuntura .
asp?t=emp75&c=1811. The pre-1995 data are from Galhardi (1998), whose source is also INEGI. 
Galhardi’s data show that total maquiladora employment rose from 20.3 thousand in 1970 to 131 
thousand in 1981 on its way to the 1990s levels.
17 “The Female Labor Force and Female Employment in North America,”  www.naalc.org/english/
ewna_part1.shtml
18 From the INEGI web site: http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/anu.
asp?t=mtra09&c=3600.
19 From the INEGI web site:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/anu.asp?t=mtra06&c=3655
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explained by their different coverage and definitions and by the difficulties 
that traditional data collection methods have in counting female employment 
(points explained by McCaa et al .). However, these data along with those of the 
INEGI suggest a substantial increase in the labor force participation of females 
in the 1990s.
While the changes in labor force participation in Mexico are important 
bases for understanding the emigration experiences of the recent past, these 
changes along with the continuing relatively low level of the female labor force 
participation rate are relevant for anticipating future emigration. Although 
Mexico’s labor force participation rate – overall or for females – is not low 
compared with many other low or middle income countries, it is low relative 
to the richer countries. For example, for 2003, the OECD reports an overall 
labor force participation rate for Mexico of 61.2 percent, while the average for 
the OECD is 69.8 percent; for women, the Mexican rate is reported as 40.5 
percent, and the OECD average is 59.6 percent (OECD, 2004). Moreover, the 
path of rising labor force participation rates, especially for women, is one that 
has been common in many low income countries in recent decades (Beneria, 
1989). There is, accordingly, every reason to believe that the trends of the 
recent decades in Mexico will continue well into the future. 
4 .3 . employment and incomeS
In spite of Mexico’s relatively slow economic growth during the 1990 to 
2004 period and the large expansion of the labor force, official unemployment 
rates did not increase over the decade. Indeed, while in 1991 the official rate 
was 2.2 percent, in 2000 it had fallen to 1.6 percent; even with the poor 
GDP growth of the early part of the next decade, the official unemployment 
rate in 2004 was only 2.5 percent. When GDP plunged in 1995, the official 
unemployment rate rose to only 4.9 percent.20
As is widely recognized, of course, in Mexico (and in other countries where 
unemployment insurance and social welfare programs are minimal) there is 
widespread underemployment. One measure of underemployment is the virtual 
lack of labor productivity increase in the 1991 to 2004 period. According to 
OECD data, labor productivity in Mexico’s business sector rose by only 1.8 
percent in this entire thirteen year period.21 
More important for the purposes of understanding the motivation to 
emigrate, incomes stagnated. Between 1991 and 2004, real compensation 
20 From the INEGI web site:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/anu.asp?t=mtra38&c=3630.
21 The OECD data are available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/47/2483871.xls. A similar 
stagnation of productivity is implicit in the data on GDP growth and employment growth. Between 
1991 and 2004, while GDP rose by 42.9 percent, the occupied labor force grew by 38.6 percent, 
providing a crude indication that productivity rose by only 3.1 percent in the entire 13 year period. 
The GDP data are from the same IMF source as the data in Table 1, and the labor force data are from 
the INEGI web site:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/anu.asp?t=mtra09&c=3600.
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per employee in the business sector declined by 21 percent. (A sharp decline 
followed the 1994 crisis, and real compensation dropped by 31 percent in 
the 1994 to 1997 period; recovery in subsequent years has been minimal.)22 
During the 1992 to 2002 decade, average real household income per 
household member increased by only 6.4 percent, while in this same period, 
real per capita GDP rose by 12 percent; these data indicate that a growing 
share of income was not going to the household sector.23 These changes are 
consistent with the substantial real decline in the statutory minimum wage, 
which fell by 29 percent between 1990 and 2004 (an actual slowing of the 
longer term trend, as the real decline had been more than 50 percent in the 
1980s).24 
The limited data available that measure income distribution directly in 
Mexico do not, however, show a rise of inequality during these years. The 
Gini coefficient for 2000 for household income reported by INEGI of .4811 
was slightly higher than the .4749 reported for 1992, but the ratio stood at 
.4558 in 1996 and fell back down to .4541 in 2002.25 Although the declines 
in employee compensation noted above are partly offset by the increase in 
the labor force participation rate (and thus the slight rise in average household 
incomes), these various data on income distribution imply that over time a 
larger share of income was being obtained outside the household sector and, 
probably, by foreign firms. 
The stagnation of incomes in Mexico is a driving force of emigration, but not 
simply because individuals move to obtain higher income in the United States. 
Emigration to the states becomes a family strategy, as remittances have played 
an increasing role in providing income to the emigrants’ family members who 
remain in Mexico. As noted above, remittances amounted to $6.6 billion in 
2000 and rose to $13.3 billion in 2003 (Orozco, 2004). Indeed, emigration is 
not simply a family strategy, but seems also to be a community strategy, as local 
politicians in Mexico are organizing efforts to bring in remittances to finance 
projects in their towns (Thompson, 2005). Overall, remittances have become 
an increasingly important component of Mexico’s foreign exchange earnings, 
behind only the maquiladoras and oil as a source of foreign exchange.26 
22 Compensation per employee and consumer price data, allowing calculation of real compensation, 
are from the OECD and are available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/47/2483871.xls.
23 The household income per household member data are from INEGI web site, where they are 
presented in current prices:
 http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/med.asp?t=ming04&c=3316 
The consumer price index from the Banco de Mexico web site was used to convert to constant prices: 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/eInfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanciera.html. The GDP data are from Table 3. 
The different years used in the various comparisons here are dictated by the data presented by 
INEGI. 
24 From the Banco de Mexico web site:
http://www.banxico.org.mx/eInfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanciera.html.
25 From the INEGI web site:
http://www.inegi.gob.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/tematicos/mediano/anu.asp?t=ming01&c=3313.
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Even though Mexican immigrants to the United States generally enter 
into very low-wage activities, with workers’ incomes stagnant in Mexico, “the 
average amount sent back in remittances to Mexico by each migrant worker 
[in the late 1990s was] 2.4 times the official minimum wage, which [was] two-
thirds of the average working income in Mexico.” (Canales, 2003, p. 744). It 
would appear (see below) that the pattern of employment in the United States 
will continue to offer these opportunities for Mexican migrants.
4 .4 . the emigration implicationS and u .S . employment
The experience of Mexico over recent years, the years in which the 
economy has been dominated by liberalization, has generally conformed to 
the set of circumstances described in Diagram 2. Liberalization has not led 
to rapid growth. It has, however, led to a restructuring – a displacement of 
labor in agriculture, trade and services, and a rapid growth of employment in 
the maquiladora sector – that has contributed to a steady expansion of the 
labor force participation rate, especially the labor force participation rate of 
women. Moreover, lacking growth but also lacking unemployment insurance 
and social welfare programs, the Mexican economy has generated substantial 
underemployment; especially important, income expansion has been anemic, 
and incomes of the bottom segment of the population appear to have fared 
especially poorly. Under these circumstances, the population likely to emigrate 
has grown, and the high rates of migration to the United States have continued 
and are liable to continue. 
One aspect of this migration that should be noted in light of this argument 
that liberalization generates emigration is the rise in the proportion of women 
who have migrated from Mexico to the United States in recent years. This 
phenomenon has been widely noted (for example: Massey et al ., 2002, 
Durand and Massey, 2004, Marcelli and Cornelius, 2001, and Donato, 1993). 
Women have always been part of the migratory flow from Mexico to the United 
States, but a large number of these women have come as wives or children of 
male migrants. More recently, it appears that a larger share of women migrants 
have come on their own, directly seeking employment in the United States. 
To the extent that this is the case, it would be consistent with the changes 
26 According to Business Frontier, a publication of the El Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, “Mexico’s economy, like the United States’, entered recession in 2001 and has struggled ever 
since. One of the few bright spots in the Mexican economy has been the flow of money entering the 
country as workers’ remittances—money earned abroad by Mexican citizens and sent back to their 
families in Mexico. In fact, in 2002 Mexico received the most remittances of any country in the world. 
This provided some relief to the macroeconomy and fostered economic activity, especially in the 
central and southern regions. In 2003, Mexico received nearly $13.3 billion in workers’ remittances, 
an amount equivalent to about 140 percent of foreign direct investment and 71 percent of oil exports. 
Continued growth in remittances is expected in 2004. The latest data, through March 2004, show 
remittances almost 22 percent higher than the same period a year ago. As a result of their vigorous 
growth, workers’ remittances now occupy third place as a foreign exchange generator for Mexico. 
Maquiladoras continue to be the top foreign exchange generator, at $18.4 billion in 2003, followed 
by oil at $15 billion.” (FRB Dallas, 2004).
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emphasized above regarding the increasing role of women in the Mexican paid 
labor force.27
For both women and men, however, the factors bringing about the rising 
migration from Mexico to the United States are not only the changes within 
Mexico. The availability of jobs within the United States is also a major factor. For 
example, women’s migration from Mexico has been influenced by, and in turn 
influences, the structure of the labor market in the United States. Fernandez-
Kelly (1989) illustrates this phenomenon with a description of the extremely 
high rate of reliance on immigrant female labor in small scale Los Angeles 
garment and electronics factories during the 1980s. As Fernandez-Kelly, 
Sassen, and others have noted, in recent decades the forces of liberalization 
and “globalization” have not simply perpetuated the classical international 
division of labor whereby more advanced, technologically sophisticated, high-
wage activities are located in the wealthy countries (for example, the United 
States) while less advanced, technologically backward, low-wage activities 
are located in the lower income countries (for example, Mexico). The global 
organization is in fact much more complicated, and one aspect has been the 
location of many low-wage activities within the wealthy countries themselves, 
often in urban centers and often heavily dependent on immigrant – often 
unauthorized – labor.
There are several reasons for the expanding demand for low-wage labor 
in the United States that has come with global liberalization. One of these is 
that, with greater import competition from low-wage countries, production of 
various commodities within the United States is competitive only if low-wage 
labor is available. Many small firms supplying parts to larger firms (as with 
electronics) or meeting the demands of rapidly changing consumer markets 
(as with garments) can have an advantage over competitors if they are close 
to their markets; yet they lose this advantage if the competitors, located in 
low-wage areas of the world, can employ labor at lower cost. Firms located in 
the United States with access to immigrant labor, however, can have both the 
advantages of market proximity and low-wage labor.28
Another causal mechanism arises from growing inequality. On the one 
hand, inequality has generated an expansion of the number of very wealthy 
households and of their demand for services – everything from swimming pool 
27 The data, however, are not as fully reliable as one would like. Because so many of the migrants 
are now not authorized, it is difficult to be confident regarding who is migrating and why. Beyond 
the numbers, Durand and Massey (2004) note the important impact of migration on gender roles in 
Mexico. As men have migrated, leaving their families, the women left behind often take on new social 
and economic roles with more authority. One aspect of the change is that, when men leave, women 
are more likely to enter the paid labor force. Entering the paid labor force, women are then more 
likely to be in a position to migrate themselves. This is another aspect of the self-reinforcing aspect of 
migration: the more migration that takes place, the more is likely to take place in the future.
28 Even market proximity and the availability of low-wage immigrant labor are sometimes not sufficient 
to keep firms in the United States. It seems that recently, Mexican immigrants who have relied on low-
wage manufacturing jobs in the states are findings themselves out of jobs as firms move to low-wage 
havens abroad, a phenomenon that has also affected maquiladoras in Mexico (LeDuff, 2004).
liBeralization, migration, and development: the mexico-u .S . relationShip
reviSta de economía mundial 14, 2006, 57-85
78
tenders to gardeners to house servants. On the other hand, inequality – in 
particular, the wage stagnation affecting workers in the bottom two-thirds of the 
labor force – has contributed to the rising labor force participation rate in the 
United States. To maintain family income levels, more and more people have 
entered the paid labor force. Especially as women have increasingly entered the 
paid labor force, there has been an associated demand for services that were 
previously self-provided (that is, provided largely by women) – for example, 
food preparation and serving, house cleaning, and child care. Immigrants, 
Mexicans and others, are often the providers of these services. A related 
phenomenon, though in large part a consequence of demographic change 
rather than liberalization per se, is the rising size of the elderly population 
and the consequent need for workers who care for the aged – nursing home 
workers, for example.29  
Table 5 provides data, published by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS), illustrating the large growth in jobs in low-skill, low-
wage occupations. The ten occupations listed are all in the top 30 occupations 
with the largest projected absolute job growth between 2002 and 2012. 
These ten occupations all rank in the bottom 25 percent of all occupations in 
terms of median annual earnings, and all ten are classified as requiring only 
“short term on the job training.” These ten occupations, which accounted for 
12.6 percent of jobs is 2002, are expected to grow more rapidly than total 
employment over the decade and would account for 13.2 percent of jobs in 
2012. By contrast, among the BLS’s list of most rapidly growing occupations 
(as opposed to largest absolute growth, which is the basis for Table 5) are seven 
occupational categories related to information technology.30 These seven are 
projected to account for only 843 thousand new jobs between 2002 and 
2012, less than the sum of the number of jobs projected to be provided by 
two of the occupations in Table 5, “combined food preparation and serving” 
worker and “janitors and cleaners” (occupations that would likely include many 
new immigrants).31
29 While largely a consequence of demographic change, the rising demand for workers to care for 
the aged is also a consequence of structural economic changes. In an earlier era, when fewer women 
were in the paid labor force, caring for the elderly (as well as caring for everyone else!) was part of 
the unpaid labor of women in the home. While the roots of women’s entry in the paid labor force are 
many, one contributing factor, as in Mexico, has been liberalization and the downward pressure it 
has created on male wages; one of the forces moving women into the paid labor force has been the 
inadequacy of male incomes to provide a “family wage.”
30 The seven occupational categories are: network systems and data communications analysis, 
computer software engineers (applications), computer software engineers (systems software), 
database administrators, computer systems analysts, network and computer systems administrators, 
and computer and information systems managers.
31 “Landscaping and groundskeeping workers” – a category of work commonly seen as employing 
many Mexican immigrants – is also included among the BLS list of the occupations with the largest 
job growth projected for the 2002 to 2012 period. This occupation, while requiring only “short-term 
on-the-job training” is in the third quartile in terms of median annual earnings and is thus excluded 
from Table 5. Another category commonly viewed as employing numerous recent immigrants is 
“construction laborers,” a category projected to expand by 133 thousand jobs in this decade – more 
than five of the seven categories of information technology workers noted above.
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There are many problems with the occupational projection data shown in 
Table 5. For example, occupational growth of low-skill jobs depends in part on 
the availability of workers who will accept low-wage jobs, and thus to assert 
that the BLS projections show that such jobs will be available for Mexican 
immigrants involves a degree of circular reasoning. Also, the BLS occupational 
projection data do not allow identification of the substitution of low-skill 
for high-skill manufacturing jobs in various broad occupational categories. 
Nonetheless, as a crude indication of the demand in those sorts of occupations 
where Mexican immigrants are likely to find work, the data of Table 5 suggest 
that the demand will continue to be strong in the foreseeable future.
taBle 5: proJectionS of u .S . employment growth 2002-2012, all employment and Selected 
large-growth, low-earningS and low-Skill occupationS (in thouSandS)
2002 2012 change   % change
All Employment 144,014 165,319 21,305 14.8
Retail Sales Persons 4,076 4,672 596 15
Combined Food Prep & Serving Workers 1,990 2,444 454 23
Cashiers (except gaming) 3,432 3,886 454 13
Janitors and cleaners 2,267 2,681 414 18
Waiters and Waitresses 2,097 2,464 367 18
Security Guards 995 1,313 317 32
Teacher Assistants 1,277 1,571 294 23
Home Health Aides 580 859 279 48
Personal & Home Care Aides 608 854 246 40
Food Prep Workers 850 1,022 172 20
Total of the 10 18,172 21,766 3,594 20
The 10 as Share of All Emploment 12.6 13.2 16.9
Note: Thee ten occupational categories are all in the top 30 occupations with the largest projected 
absolute job growth between 2002 and 2012. All ten rank in the bottom 25% in terms of median 
annual earnings, and all ten require only “short-term on-the-job training.”
Source: Monthly Labor Review, February 2004, page 101, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2004/02/
art5full.pdf
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5 .
The argument presented here, that liberalization is likely to lead to a 
continuing high level of Mexico-to-United States migration, is somewhat 
speculative. It is, however, based on a considerable body of evidence, as well 
as on the migration record of the past several years. Moreover, the points 
developed in the preceding section are buttressed by consideration of other 
factors (mentioned earlier) – the impact of “critical mass” and the roles of 
information and culture in the general process of globalization. Some factors 
do work in the other direction – most notably the long term demographic 
trends (also mentioned earlier) and these trends may become more significant 
as an increasing number of Mexican women enter the paid labor force. It is of 
course difficult to weigh the relative force of these different factors. Yet there is 
strong reason to believe that high levels of Mexico-to-United States migration 
will be the reality for many years.
The practical implications of this argument are substantial. Viewing 
immigration as a “problem” for the United States, many commentators have 
argued that economic growth in Mexico (and in low income countries in general) 
will alleviate this problem and that liberalization will promote growth. Mexican 
experience of recent decades, however, suggests that liberalization does not 
– or, at least, does not necessarily – lead to economic growth and, further, 
that the sort of economic change that comes with liberalization can promote, 
rather than curtail, emigration. Others who also view immigration as a problem 
advocate more strict regulation of the Mexico-U.S. border, which would, they 
believe, prevent (or greatly reduce) unauthorized immigration. Experience so 
far, however, holds out little likelihood of successful interdiction as a solution 
to the immigration “problem” (Massey et al ., 2002, and Cornelius, 2002). 
Perhaps even more draconian procedures would work, but they would have 
severe social as well as financial costs (and they might not work). 
There are other ways to approach the very large Mexico-to-U.S. migration. 
One way is to stop viewing the migration itself as a problem, and view it instead 
as the reality that the analysis here suggests it is and will continue to be for 
some time. Then, once the migration is viewed as a reality, it is possible to find 
ways to minimize the problems associated with that reality.32 
Perhaps the most significant such problems are the ones that arise 
from forcing so many Mexicans (and others) to enter the country without 
authorization (so-called “illegal aliens”). The result is a large group of workers, 
operating in many industries, that has virtually no formal rights and very little 
power in relation to their employers.33 This is obviously bad for the immigrant 
32 While the argument is beyond the scope of this paper, I should note that many of us view 
immigration not only as the reality, but also as a “good thing.” Far from viewing it as a “problem,” we 
view immigration as making numerous positive contributions to life in the receiving countries.
33 Illustrating this point, Newland (2004, p. 202) notes the 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision in the 
case of Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc., in which the court ruled “that unauthorized [immigrant] 
workers cannot be awarded back-pay remedies, even if they are discharged in violation of the National 
Labor Relations Act – thus reversing a well-established trend that unauthorized workers are entitled 
to the same labor protections as authorized workers are.”
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workers themselves – one extreme result is that, according to the AFL-CIO, in 
2002 “foreign-born workers suffered 69 percent of the workplace fatalities 
in [the United States], even though they make up just 15 percent of our 
workforce” (Sweeny, 2004). But the situation is also bad for other workers as 
well because it is unlikely – if not impossible – for workers in general to have 
secure rights while a large segment of the work force exists without secure 
rights. Unionization is hampered, legislation that protects workers’ rights and 
well-being is undermined, and the workforce is more thoroughly segmented 
and politically weakened.
The reality of continuing large-scale immigration and the problems 
associated with unauthorized immigration have been recognized by the U.S. 
confederation of labor unions, the AFL-CIO. According to the President of 
the AFL-CIO, historically the American labor movement “favored a restrictive 
immigration policy, with no quarter given to workers who entered our country 
illegally… [O]ur historic position on immigration was unfair and self-defeating. 
But at the turn of the new century, it became obvious that efforts to improve 
immigration enforcement, while failing to stop the flow of undocumented 
people into the United States, had resulted in a system that was fostering 
discrimination, abuse and exploitation of documented as well as undocumented 
workers by unscrupulous employers” (Sweeny, 2004). 
While the immigration reforms called for by the AFL-CIO are limited, the 
organization’s shift of policy is of considerable significance, representing 
a dramatic change of course for the principal organization of the American 
labor movement. Moreover, the AFL-CIO’s position accepts the high levels 
of immigration as a reality and seeks ways to most effectively cope with the 
situation. It is not immigration that is the problem; the problem is the structure 
of immigration regulation which creates a large under-class of unauthorized 
workers.34
The pressures for Mexico-to-U.S. migration are very great. Perhaps they 
are not as great as those in the opposite direction imagined by the makers of 
the disaster movie The Day After Tomorrow. But today and tomorrow those 
pressures are and will be powerful enough to maintain a continuing high rate of 
northwards migration. If this reality is recognized, responses and adjustments 
can be more positive.
34 Of course most Mexicans living in the United States live in areas that were taken from Mexico by 
the United States in the 1840s, and thus there is a certain irony, as my daughter Anna pointed out to 
me, in classifying these people as “unauthorized.”
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